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Given that more than 30% of healthcare costs are wasted on inappropriate care, suboptimal care
is increasingly connected to the quality of medical decisions. It has been argued that personal
decisions are the leading cause of death, and 80% of healthcare expenditures result from physi-
cians' decisions. Therefore, improving healthcare necessitates improving medical decisions, ie,
making decisions (more) rational.
Drawing on writings fromThe Great Rationality Debate from the fields of philosophy, economics,
and psychology, we identify core ingredients of rationality commonly encountered across various
theoretical models. Rationality is typically classified under umbrella of normative (addressing the
question how people “should” or “ought to” make their decisions) and descriptive theories of deci-
sion‐making (which portray how people actually make their decisions). Normative theories of ratio-
nal thought of relevance to medicine include epistemic theories that direct practice of evidence‐
basedmedicine and expected utility theory, which provides the basis forwidely used clinical decision
analyses. Descriptive theories of rationality of direct relevance to medical decision‐making include
bounded rationality, argumentative theory of reasoning, adaptive rationality, dual processing model
of rationality, regret‐based rationality, pragmatic/substantive rationality, and meta‐rationality.
For the first time, we provide a review of wide range of theories and models of rationality. We
showed that what is “rational” behaviour under one rationality theory may be irrational under the
other theory. We also showed that context is of paramount importance to rationality and that no
one model of rationality can possibly fit all contexts. We suggest that in context‐poor situations,
such as policy decision‐making, normative theories based on expected utility informed by best
research evidence may provide the optimal approach to medical decision‐making, whereas in the
context‐rich circumstances other types of rationality, informed by human cognitive architecture
and driven by intuition and emotions such as the aim to minimize regret, may provide better
solution to the problem at hand. The choice of theory under which we operate is important as it
determines both policy and our individual decision‐making.1 | INTRODUCTION
The United States spends nearly 18% ($2.7 trillion) of its GDP on
healthcare, yet more than 30% is wasted on inappropriate care.1
Increasingly, suboptimal care is connected to the quality of medical
decisions.1 It has been argued that personal decisions are the leading
cause of death2, and that 80% of healthcare expenditures result from
physicians' decisions.3,4 Therefore, improving healthcare necessitates- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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TABLE 1 Core ingredients (“Principles”) of rationality commonly
identified across theoretical models




in order to fulfil our goals (eg, better health).
• P2: It typically occurs under conditions of uncertainty.
• Rational approach requires reliable evidence to deal with the
inherent uncertainties.
• Relies on cognitive processes that allow integration of
probabilities/uncertainties.
• P3: Rational thinking should be informed by human cognitive
architecture.
• composed of type 1 reasoning processes, which characterizes
“old mind” (affect‐based, intuitive, fast, resource‐frugal) and type
2 processes (analytic and deliberative, consequential driven, and
effortful) of “new mind”
• P4: Rationality depends on the context and should respect
epistemological, environmental, and computational constraints of
human brains
• P5: Rationality (in medicine) is closely linked to ethics and morality of
our actions
• requires consideration of utilitarian (society‐oriented), duty‐
bound (individual‐oriented), and right‐based (autonomy, “no
decision about me, without me”) ethics
Text in bold identifies core ingredients of rationality.
TABLE 2 A list of major theories and models of rationality of rele-
vance to medical decision‐making
Adaptive or ecological rationality10,11: a descriptive theory, a variant of
bounded rationality, which stipulates that human decision‐making
depends on the context and environmental cues; hence, rational
behaviour/decision‐making requires adaptation to environment/
patient circumstances. Sometimes referred to as “panglossian”5,12, the
position that humans should be considered to be a priori rational due
to optimal evolutionary processes.
Example: dominates medical practice, which relies on extrapolation of
research evidence to specific patient circumstances including social
context, co‐morbidities, etc
Argumentative Theory of Reasoning13,14: proposes that reason and
rational thinking has evolutionary evolved with primary social function
to justify one selves and convince others to be believed and gain their
trust.
Example: doctors invoke evidence‐based knowledge out of sense that it
would be approved by the medical community and, in doing, preserve
their reputation and improve health of their patients.
Bounded rationality15,16: a descriptive theory, which posits that
reflective of principle that rationality should respect epistemological,
environmental and computational constraints of human brains,
rational behaviour relies on satisficing process (finding a good enough
solution) instead of EUT maximizing approach. The heuristic approach
to decision‐making is the mechanism of implementation of bounded
rationality.17 Often linked to prescriptive models of rationality18
designs for improvement of human rationality informed by cognitive
architecture
Example: simple fast‐and‐frugal tree using readily available clinical cues
outperformed 50 variables multivariable logistic model regarding
decision whether to admit the patient with chest pain to coronary care
unit.10
Deontic introduction theory19: a descriptive theory of inference from
“Is” to “Ought,” implies that rationality requires integration of the
evidence related to the problem at hand (“Is”) with the goals and
values to decisions and actions (“Ought”), while taking context into
account. See also grounded rationality.
Example: See text.
Dual processing theories of rational thought (DPTRT)5: a family of
theories based on the architecture of human cognition, contrasting
intuitive (type 1) processes with effortful (type 2) processes. A
descriptive variant of this approach is that the rational action should
be coherent with formal principles of rationality as well as human
intuitions about good decisions. The normative/prescriptive variant of
this theory is sometimes referred to as “meliorism,”5,12 the position
that humans are often irrational but can be educated to be rational.
According to Meliorist principles, when the goals of the genes clash
with the goals of the individual (see below), the rational course of
action should be dictated by the latter.
Example: physicians often adjust their recommendations based on their
intuition.20
DPTRT can be thought of as a combination/contrast of:
Old mind/evolutionary rationality/rationality of the genes21,22: the
rationality linked to evolutionarily‐instilled goals (sex, hunger, etc).
Past‐oriented and relying on type 1 mechanisms, it is driven by the
evolutionary past and by experiential learning.
Example: Eating chocolates when one has to reduce weight.
New mind/individual rationality21,22: the rationality linked to the goals
of the individual rather than those of the genes. It is future‐oriented
and relies on type 2 mechanisms, most importantly the ability to run
mental simulations of future events and hypothetical situations. This is
what enables humans to think consequentially and solve novel
problems.
Example: use of contraceptives. The genes' goal is to self‐replicate, ie, to
produce more copies of themselves. Contraceptives negate this goal
while allowing humans greater individual freedom.
Evidence‐based medicine approach to rational decision‐making23: a
normative theory, which posits that there is a link between rationality
and believing what is true [our actions and beliefs are justifiable (or,
(Continues)
2 DJULBEGOVIC AND ELQAYAMpractice of medicine. The debate about rational thought reveals a strik-
ing lack of consensus on universally accepted definition of rationality
(Table 2 lists definitions of major theories of rationality and their rele-
vance to medicine).7 In turn, these different definitions of rationality
have profound implications on what type of decision‐making should
be embraced in clinical practice. We draw on core principles from the
rationality debate to outline guidelines toward selecting context‐appro-
priate practical prescriptivemodels for rationalmedical decision‐making.
But, first, what do we mean by “rational”medical decision‐making?
Importantly, rationality does not guarantee that every single decision
would be error‐free; on the contrary, rational decision‐making takes
into account the consequences of possible errors—false negatives and
false positives—to aid in arriving at desirable outcomes. Rationality is
often defined as acting in a way that helps us achieve our goals,5,8 which
in clinical setting typically means desire to improve our health. Most
major theories of choice agree that our goals are best achieved if we
take into account both benefits (gains) and harms (losses) of alternative
courses of actions, which in medical context (as in everyday life) often
occur under conditions of uncertainty (principles 1 and 2, Table 1).
The “rationality debate” has revolved around the most optimal
procedures that are needed to achieve our goals. This is sometimes
referred to rationality1, or pragmatic rationality, which describes what
people actually do to achieve their goals; in contrast to rationality2, or
normative rationality, which is the rationality defined by conformity to
a normative standard such as expected utility theory (EUT).8 Even
though the relation between normative and pragmatic rationalities
continue to be debated, as well as the question whether normative
models are necessary at all,9 a number of the insights that have emerged
over the last several decades are already highly relevant to practice of
medicine as we outline below.(Continues)
TABLE 2 (Continued)
reasonable/rational) as a function of the trustworthiness of the
evidence, and the extent to which we believe that evidence is
determined by credible processes]. See also epistemic rationality.
Example: Clinical practice guidelines panels more readily recommend
health interventions if the quality of evidence supporting such a
recommendation is high.24
Epistemic rationality: the rationality based on acquisition of true/fit‐for‐
purpose knowledge. Linked to new mind rationality21 (see also
grounded rationality).
Example: evidence‐based medicine approach to decision‐making
Grounded rationality25: a descriptive theory, which postulates that
rationality should be judged within epistemic context, ie, what is
known to a decision maker and his/her goals, and that rational course
of is the one that facilitates the achievement of our goals given the
context. See also pragmatic rationality.
Example: To achieve health goals, physicians typically recommend
treatment with which they are familiar/know about.
Meta‐rationality6 or the master rationality motive26: Relies on DPTRT,
which posits that rationality represents hierarchical goal integration
while taking into account both emotions and reasons. It also refers
to integration of so called thin theories of rationality: Theories in
which the goals, context and desires of behaviour are not evaluated
(as per, for example, applying EUT without taking patient's desires
into account)—that is, any goal is as good as any other goal with
Broad theories of rationality: Theories of rationality in which the
goals and desires of the decision maker are evaluated within context
and in such a way as to achieve hierarchical coherence within
goals.22,27
Example: subsumes other variants of DPTRT and is often characteristic
of a “wise” physician; the approach is particularly evident in high‐
stake, high‐emotional decisions such as end‐of‐life where the
substantive goals about achievable health status have to be




type of rationality associated with conformity to a normative standard
such as the probability calculus or classical logic. In medicine, the most
dominant normative theory is EUT, which is based on mathematical
axioms of rationality according to which rational choice is associated
with selection of the alternative with higher expected utility (expected
utility is the average of all possible results weighted by their
corresponding probabilities). It is typically based on Bayesian
probability calculus.a
Example: decision analyses such as EUT‐based micro simulation model to
develop screening recommendations for colorectal cancer30
Pragmatic/instrumental rationality/rationality1
8 or substantive
rationality31,32: a descriptive theory, which states that rationality
depends on the content not only on the structure of decisions
(process) and that the content should be assessed in light of short‐
and long‐term goals (purpose). Fits with the descriptivist approach9
which argues that empirical evidence cannot support the “oughtness”
of a model
Example: dominates clinical decision‐making particularly in the fields
such as oncology, where desirable health goals (eg, cure) may not be
possible; as a result, the re‐evaluation of both goals and decision
procedures may be needed (eg, switch from aggressive treatment to
palliative care in advanced incurable cancers, etc)
Regret regulation‐rationality is characterized by regulation of regret33:
a variant of DPTRT that relies on regret, which as a cognitive emotion
uses counterfactual reasoning processes to tap in analytical aspect of
our cognitive architecture as well as in affect‐based decision‐making.
According to this view, medical rational decision‐making is associated
with regret‐averse decision processes.
Example: Contemporary medical practice has increasingly adopted that
patients' values and preferences should be consulted before a health
intervention is given. However, patient values and preferences heavily
depend on emotions such as regret, which, if properly elicited, may
improve vigilance in decision‐making.34-36
(Continues)
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Robust satisficing31,32: a variant of regret‐based DPTRT according to
which rational course is to “maximize confidence in a good enough
outcome even if the things go poorly” (instead of maximizing EUT); the
concept, which is similar to “acceptable regret”37,38 hypothesis of
rational decision‐making, which postulates that we can rationally
accept some losses without feeling regret.
Example: Annual screening mammography over 10 years in women older
than 50 will prevent 1 death per 1000 from breast cancer but at cost
of 50 to 200 unnecessary false alarms and 2 to 10 unnecessary breast
removals.39 When it comes to the decisions like these, which are
value‐ and emotion‐driven decisions, there is no right or wrong
answers. Some women will accept harms for a small chance of
avoiding death from breast cancer. Others may not.40
Threshold model of rational action proposes that the most rational
decision is to prescribe treatment or order a diagnostic test when the
expected treatment benefit outweighs its expected harms at given
probability of disease or clinical outcome.41 It has been formulated
both within EUT,42,43 dual processing theories44 and regret
framework.37,38,41,45
Example: See text.
Abbreviation: EUT, expected utility theory.
Text in bold refers to headings i.e., listing of theories rationality.
aRecently classical Bayesian models were contrasted against quantum
models of rationality,46 but at this time, the applied value of the quantum
models remains uncertain.
(Continues)
DJULBEGOVIC AND ELQAYAM 3To highlight the concepts we just introduced, we start with a
description of the normative view of rationality in clinical medicine,
mainly EUT and evidence‐based medicine (EBM); we then outline perti-
nent descriptive principleswhich normativemodels disregard, highlight-
ing the importance of dual processing cognitive architecture, emotion,
intuition, and context. Note that there are many decision theories; each
theory has its proponents and critics—our goal is not to critically
appraise the pro and con arguments of all theories of rational choice
but to simply enlist common rationality theories and their potential rel-
evance to medicine. However, we propose that dual processing archi-
tecture is a key principle of ethical medical decision‐making. We
conclude by suggesting that no single model of rationality can possibly
fit all contexts. We propose a prescriptive set of cognitively informed
guidelines for selection of pragmatically rational behaviours for medical
decision‐making, illustrated through 1 specific (ie, threshold) model.2 | THE NORMATIVE APPROACH TO
RATIONALITY IN CLINICAL MEDICINE
Standard normative theories of rational choice rely on mathematical
analyses to help derive the optimal course of action, the one which
we “should” or “ought” to pursue. They typically use EUT, the basis
of applied decision analysis. Importantly, EUT is the arguably only the-
ory of choice that satisfies all mathematical axioms of rational decision‐
making. According to EUT, rational decision‐making is associated with
selection of the alternative with higher expected utility such as higher
quality‐adjusted life years. Expected utility theory dominates medical
decision‐making literature, as evidenced by numerous decision
analyses aiming to generate best advice for physicians and patients.
For example, the US Preventive Services Task Force used decision
analysis to identify the optimal test for colorectal cancer screening.30
4 DJULBEGOVIC AND ELQAYAMNormative theories of choice have also pointed out that rationality
of choice is a matter of the procedure of choosing and not of what is
chosen: A good decision can result in bad outcomes; a bad decision
can result in good outcomes. However, in a long run, better decisions
should also result on the whole in better outcomes. Within framework
of EBM, the higher quality of evidence inspires greater confidence in
the estimate of health interventions' effects, because such estimates
about effects of health interventions are closer to the truth.23 According
to this view, rationality is consistent with response to evidence in the
fitting way.23,47 All things equal, it is more rational to act based on
well‐conducted randomized trials than on the observational evidence.23
The importance of understanding this aspect of rationality can be
best appreciated within the recent US health law linking financing
of healthcare with performance and “value.” Fifty per cent of
physicians' compensation will be linked to the “quality” of care,
which is measured by both process of care (eg, adherence to
practice guidelines) and patient outcomes,48 although the latter are
beyond physicians' control, making such a policy hardly rational.
Nevertheless, EBM is yet to develop a coherent theory of healthcare
decision‐making, and examples abound how evidence alone is not
sufficient for effective decision‐making.49
Normative models of decision‐making are mathematical abstracts
and must be justified philosophically and mathematically, which makes
them impervious to empirical evidence of cognitive mechanisms (princi-
ple 3, Table 1). It is prescriptive models that bridge between normative
models and human cognition and between descriptive and normative
theories of rational choice. Prescriptive models are pragmatic “ought”
models, sets of cognitive tools engineered to support rational
decision‐making.50-52 As an applied field, medical decision makers face
decisions fraught with moral and pragmatic significance. Developing
prescriptive models of rational and ethical medical decision‐making is
crucial in a waywhich goes beyond canned rationality in the lab.9 Unlike
normative models, prescriptive models need to be informed by
psychological evidence of the way that people actually reason and
make decisions, to which we turn next.3 | DESCRIPTIVE PRINCIPLES OF
DECISION‐MAKING I: DUAL PROCESSING,
INTUITION AND EMOTION
Researchers have extensively documented the “normative‐descriptive
gap”: People often violate normative standards,27 in particular the pre-
cepts of EUT. Descriptive theories of decision‐making attempt to
explain this gap (theories of “is” versus “ought”). Two fundamental
issues have been identified: Making the full computations required for
EUT requires effortful analytic processes, neglecting other aspects of
human cognitive architecture such as intuition and emotions stipulated
by dual processing theories of human cognition (principle 3, Table 1).
Dual process theories of cognition portray human cognitive architec-
ture as composed of type 1 processes, characterized as “old mind”
(affect‐based, intuitive, fast, and resource‐frugal) and type 2 processes
(analytic, deliberative, consequential, and effortful) of “newmind.”5,21,53
Moreover, EUT does not (cannot and must not) take into account
context or individual differences, all of which characterizes humandecision‐making. As a result, people often do not calibrate well proba-
bilities of events (eg, disease outcomes) and give much higher weight
to both low probabilities (possibility effect) and high probabilities (cer-
tainty effect).54-56 The latter illustrates our intolerance of uncertainty
and results in our “stubborn quest for diagnostic certainty,”57 the ten-
dency to perform diagnostic tests even when their utility is question-
able, which continues to be one of the main drivers of excessive
testing and healthcare costs. Importantly, although acting according
to descriptive theories violate precepts of EUT, as argued in this
paper, depending on the setting, their use may help us achieve our
goals better than EUT.
To understand decision‐making processes, we crucially need to
understand the role emotions play when we weigh benefits and risks
of our actions.58 The philosopher David Hume famously observed that
“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions”59—without
emotion we have no goals, and without goals there is no rationality.21
In fact, regulation of emotions, chief among which is regret, represents
one of the key ingredients of rational behaviour.33
Rationality often aims to regulate regret.6,31,33We are regret‐averse:
Many of our decisions are driven by desire to avoid regret and minimize
risks. Regret operates via “robust satisficing”31-33—the concept similar to
“acceptable regret”: We can rationally accept some losses without
feeling regret37,38 (Table 2). The latter is widely documented in clinical
medicine where, for example, ordering myriad of tests is often accept-
able practice even it deviates from the normative standards.37,38
Regret is a cognitive emotion, characterized by a counterfactual
reasoning process: We regret when we compare the actual outcome
to what might have happened but did not happen. It is a powerfully
aversive emotion, and we are motivated to behave in such a way so
as we would not come to regret our actions. It is also a feat of effort-
ful processing, since counterfactual thinking requires hypothetical
simulation of possibilities—in other words, new mind processing. Thus,
regret serves as a link between intuitive and effortful processes
(Table 2) providing mechanism for dual process rationality model.60
When regret is taken into account, “stubborn quest for diagnostic
certainty”57 may not be irrational.37,38,614 | DESCRIPTIVE PRINCIPLES OF
DECISION‐MAKING II : SATISFICING AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT
Human processing is often too limited to find the most optimal solution
to a given problem (principle 4, Table 1). Difficulties vary as a function
of factors such characteristics of the decision itself (eg, high stakes vs
low‐stakes situations, etc), situation/context (eg, clinical setting, time
pressure, cognitive load, framing effect, social context, conflict of
interest, etc), and individual characteristics of the decision maker
(eg, cultural background,12 professional background, cognitive ability,
decision‐making styles, etc).62 This means that rational behaviour
requires adaptation to environment (adaptive or ecological rationality),10
and to individual characteristics (grounded rationality)25 (see Table 2).
Because finding the optimum solution to a given problem can be
resource‐ and computationally intensive, adaptive behaviours typically
relies on satisficing (finding a good enough solution), as a rationality
DJULBEGOVIC AND ELQAYAM 5principle (bounded rationality), rather than optimizing/maximizing
(striving to find a “perfect” solution).63 Mental shortcuts or heuristics
—a “strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of
making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more
complex methods”11—rely on the satisficing principle and can
sometimes outperform complex statistical models (“less‐is‐more”).10 That
is, heuristics represent mechanisms to implement bounded rationality.17
Use of heuristics dominates medical teaching including wide popularity
of clinical pathways and algorithms that resembles fast‐and‐frugal trees
(FFT), highly effective, simple decision trees composed of sequentially
ordered cues (tests) and binary (yes/no) decisions formulated via series
of if‐then statements.64 The FFT can be linked to EUT and regret via the
threshold model,64 which is intimately related to the question of
rational decision‐making; the threshold model has been formulated
both within EUT,42,43 dual processing theories44 and regret frame-
work.37,38,41,45 The threshold represents a linchpin between evidence
(which exists on the continuum of credibility) and decision‐making
(which is a categorical exercise—we decide to act or not act).41
According to the EUT threshold, the most rational decision is to
prescribe treatment when the expected treatment benefit outweighs
its expected harms at given probability of disease or clinical outcome,
regardless of context.42,43 The EUT threshold model stipulates that as
the therapeutic benefit/harm ratio increases, the threshold probability
at which treatment is justified, is lowered.42,43 Conversely, when a
treatment's benefit/harm ratio is smaller, the required threshold for
therapeutic action will be higher.42,43 For example, benefit/harm ratio
of administering antituberculotics to a patient with suspected tubercu-
losis is about 33 in terms ofmorbidity/mortality outcomes; according to
EUT, rational physicians should then prescribe antituberculotics when
the probability of tuberculosis exceeds 3% only.65 However, physicians
would typically not treat a patient suspected of tuberculosis below a
threshold between 20% and 50% largely because regret of commission
associated with unnecessary treatment outweighs regret of omission
due to failure to administer antituberculotics.65 In contrast, from the
regret threshold model perspective, the most rational decision to pre-
scribe treatment is when regret of failing to administer beneficial treat-
ment outweighs regret of harms of unnecessary treatment.41 Thus,
EUT and regret thresholds are often different, and might vary individu-
ally, which can explain variation in care widely documented in the con-
temporary practice: Physicians act as if they have different thresholds
depending on context, which in turn could be a function of regret, dif-
ferent ways of cognitively assessing disease probability or the conse-
quences (benefits and harms) of treatments.41,44,45 Because most
evaluation of drugs effects goes through the regulatory approval
agencies such as FDA, they will be approved for the use in practice
only if benefits outweigh harms; similarly, most tests are perceived
as harmless. This means that the threshold for prescribing drugs or
ordering diagnostic tests will be predictably low according to EUT;
even if that is most rational thing to do, most patients who received
treatment will not actually have the disease for which treatment is
given.41,45,66 This creates a paradox: EUT, the normative theory
widely accepted as gold rationality standard in medicine will predict-
ably lead to further increase (and waste) in the use of diagnostic and
treatment interventions!41,45,61 Thus, insisting on applying EUT can
be pragmatically irrational.5 | RATIONALITY AND MORALITY IN
MEDICAL DECISION‐MAKING: THE CASE OF
GOALS AND VALUES
Principle 5 (Table 1) states that rationality in medicine is closely linked
to ethics and morality of our actions. These actions normally require
consideration of all major ethical frameworks: utilitarian (society‐ori-
ented) considerations, which emphasize the consequences of actions;
and various deontological considerations, which rely on rights and
duties: duty‐bound (individual‐oriented) and right‐based ethics (“no
decision aboutme, withoutme” is heavily promotedwithin a framework
of EBM). (While policy makers might prefer to communicate primarily
deontological consideration,67 often ethical decision‐making requires
both, especially in clinical medicine, where goals and consequences of
actions play a major role.) Decision‐making according to each of these
views focuses on somewhat different goals—interest of individual vs
society, which often result in goal conflicts. For example, the recent call
for person‐centred healthcare can be regarded as a shift from “medicine
of the disease” goal to “medicine of the whole person” goal.68,69 How to
make rational and moral decisions when these considerations are in
conflict? One of our aims is to develop guidelines for medical pragmatic
rationality, the rationality focused on achieving one's goals. But goals
are notoriously slippery and prone to conflict;53 where there is a clash
between goals, pragmatic rationality faces a particular challenge.
This is a pertinent issue because uncertainty remains inherent in
medical decision‐making; we cannot escape making false negative or
false positive decision errors, which will affect different people in
different ways.70 For example, attempts to reduce overtesting (false
positive decisions) are beneficial to society but may lead to underuse
(false negative decisions) in individual patients.70 Such goal conflict
under conditions of irreducible uncertainty, leading to inevitable error,
will generate unavoidable injustice (resulting in the trade‐off of goals
of individuals vs society).71
Deontic Introduction Theory—a descriptive theory of inference
from “is” to “ought”19—demonstrated that people are disposed to cre-
ate novel normative rules when conditional relations (“If you smoke,
you will probably get lung cancer”) causally link action and a valued
(positive or negative) goal (“Lung cancer is undesirable outcome”).
Value transference from outcome to action (“Smoking is bad”) and
deontic bridging to an appropriate deontic operator (such as “should,”
“may,” “must,” etc) result in normative (deontic) conclusions such as
“You should not smoke.”19 Interestingly, both tendency to rely on reli-
able information (“Is”)72 and generate “ought” or “should” statements
(“Faced with the knowledge that there are hungry children in Somalia,
we easily and naturally infer that we ought to donate to famine relief
charities”) seem to be evolutionary determined.19
Both rationality and morality have been portrayed as a function
of the interactions between these 2 types of processes,8,73 with
utilitarian moral judgments linked to effortful processing and
deontological moral judgement linked to intuitive processing. In the
acute, life‐threatening situations, where avoiding harms is most
important, it makes rational and moral sense to use type 1 processes,
while type 2 processes may fit long‐term goals better. When the
goals conflict, immediate personal goals or strong utilitarian or
deontological rules can suppress normative conclusions.19 These
6 DJULBEGOVIC AND ELQAYAMprocesses increasingly operate in clinical setting: With rising costs in
healthcare, cost‐effectiveness considerations—what is rational for
society based on EUT may not be rational for individuals—cannot
be avoided.74
Stanovich5,6,27 proposed that rationality reflects the goal integra-
tion (meta‐rationality). We should aim to coherently integrate our
hierarchy of goals (“desire to act in accordance with reasons”).6 Both
emotions and expected utility of outcomes matter.6 The trick may be
to ask deliberatively and reflectively75 about the appropriateness of
our emotional reactions to a decision and “to value formal principles
of rationality, but not to take them too seriously.”6,32,766 | TOWARD CONTEXTUALIZED RATIONAL
CLINICAL DECISION‐MAKING: INTEGRATING
THE CORE PRINCIPLES
Our goals in this paper were to provide a synopsis of the state of the
art in the rationality debate in the contest of clinical medicine, describe
some potential limitations of normative models in specific contexts of
medical decision‐making, and outline guidelines toward selecting
context‐appropriate prescriptive models for pragmatically rational
medical decision‐making. For the first time, we provide a review of
wide range of theories and models of rationality (Table 2). Contrary
to the received view in much of medical decision‐making, we argue
that the great rationality debate amply demonstrates that there is no
one uniformly accepted way to exercise rational decision‐making.
Moreover, the normative gold standard of rational decision‐making,
EUT, can lead to instrumentally irrational behaviours, most worryingly
overtesting and overtreatment.
We do not propose a single normative model to replace EUT;
instead, we posit that unified, one‐size‐fits‐all theory of rationality
may not, in fact, be possible. Fundamentally, we argue that what is
“rational” behaviour under one rationality theory may be irrational
under the other theory. The choice of theory under which we operate
is important as it determines both policy and our individual decision‐
making. In fact, we contend, we should pragmatically adopt definition
of rationality to the problem at hand. Because such adoption is
context‐sensitive, it is not possible to recommend any specific model.
Instead, we propose that the core principles in Table 1 can potentially
provide guidelines toward selecting normatively and cognitively
informed prescriptive models applicable to each context. Thus, we
propose that pragmatically rational medical decision‐making crucially
depends on integration of the evidence related to the problem at hand
(“Is”) with the goals and values to decisions and actions (“Ought”),19
while taking context into account. Hence, rational medical action
should respect underlying evidence and be coherent with [a tractable
form of] formal principles of rationality as well as human emotions
and intuitions about good decisions and ethical principles taking the
utility of society and the individual into account. The rejection of a
unified theory of rational medical decision‐making and highlighting
the need to match rationality model to specific medical circumstances
has not been attempted before. Respecting the principles outlined in
Table 1, one proposal for clinical medicine may play out along the
following lines.From policy perspectives, using EUT informed by best available
current evidence (EBM) might be the most rational approach to deci-
sion‐making. This is because policy decisions are typically high‐level
decisions voided of the granular, contextual details that characterize
individual decision‐making at bedside and because policy makers are
in position to draw on the necessary extensive computational
resources. For example, using EUT‐based rationality USPSTF “recom-
mends screening for colorectal cancer using fecal occult blood testing,
sigmoidoscopy, or colonoscopy in adults, beginning at age 50 years
and continuing until age 75 years.”30
This recommendation, however, applies to imaginary “average”
person and needs to be tempered on the ground by contextualized
adaptive and grounded rationality. For example, the patient who is
chronologically older than 75 years, may actually be clinically and bio-
logically in better condition than the patient who is nominally 75 years
old. Thus, a strategy may take a form of heuristics such as relying on
FFT (eg, “if the patient does not have any comorbidities and has excel-
lent performance status, h/she should be recommended colonoscopy
even if older than 75”). In other situations, acceptable regret37/robust
satisficing31 may be appropriate decision‐making strategy (seeTable 2).
In the end, “ practical wisdommay be the hallmark of rationality,”31,32
often in medicine captured in terms of saying: “A good doctor knows
how to treat/order a diagnostic test, a better one knows when to
treat/order a test, but best one knows when not to do it….” The
characteristics of such decision‐making, among other things are ability
to distinguish between reducible and irreducible uncertainty and
knowing how to handle false‐positive and false‐negative errors in
explicit and transparent ways, to specify what values are placed on
these errors, and to understand the potential for unavoidable injustice,
because the consequences of actions may affect different individuals in
different ways.71 We conclude that no “one size” rationality model fits
all clinical circumstances and decision makers. Empirical research is
needed to identify the situations which can be best matched to given
rationality strategy.
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